A Critical Examination of the Sustainability of the Ethiopian Federal Governance Model & Whether it Has Achieved Its Envisioned Goals

Abstract

Managing ethnic-related conflicts and providing regional autonomy for various groups is at the core of federal state systems.  Countries that often opt for federal systems are those with huge populations and multiple ethnic groups. In Ethiopia, federalism was introduced in 1991 and solidified through the Ethiopian Federal Constitution (FDRE) (1995), which distributed power to nine regions at the time. Thus, by ceding some of the powers from the center to the regions, the federal government aimed to offer varied groups a sense of ownership and belonging. This study examines the Ethiopian federal system to gauge whether the lofty ambitions of federalism have been realized, thirty years after the enactment of the Federal Constitution. To accomplish this, the study employs a qualitative methodology based on document analysis to critically examine the functioning and foundational character of Ethiopia’s federal structure. The study finds that while the creation of the federal government has led to some successes, the federal system, overall, has not delivered tangible results, especially because many people in various regions still feel marginalized. Specifically, people feel excluded from economic relations and remain fearful of the recurrence of civil conflict. This discontent shows that, despite having a robust federal Constitution, the absence of a strong political will, such as a lack of genuine inclusivity in governance, and the absence of a firm conviction by political leaders to rise above regional and ethnic politics, federalism on its own cannot deliver peace and economic prosperity.